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A
 
BSTRACT
 
This study aims to discuss the foreign policies of the pro-Islamist parties in
Turkey by comparing the party programs and policies of the Justice and Development Party
(Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi) and the Welfare Party (Refah Partisi). By focusing on programs
and policies separately, it is argued that pro-Islamist elements in the establishment and
program of the parties do not necessarily translate to actual policies, particularly in foreign
affairs. Moreover, pro-Islamist political parties are not monolithic in terms of member
composition; the parties also differ from each other. Finally, the parties might have different
policies in the domestic context while employing a more pragmatic and traditionalist
perspective in terms of foreign policy.
 
Islamization both at the societal and state level has been a central topic in political
debates, especially since September 11. Many countries, once secular although not
necessarily democratic, today emphasize religious identity. Iran might be the most
famous example; however, Islamization in Turkey provides a distinctive case for
the country’s specific historical experience with religion. Turkey has had a
secular orientation—part of the Kemalist ideology—since the establishment of the
Republic in 1923; nevertheless, increasing support for Islamist movements around
the world influenced Turkey as well. In this context, not only domestic but also
foreign policy implications are matters of concern, given that the incumbent
Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi, AKP) has emerged
out of the country’s historically most prominent religious movement, Milli Görü
 
[SCEDIL]
 
(National Outlook).
This essay aims to discuss the foreign policies of the pro-Islamist parties that
have come to power in Turkey so as to determine, first, whether there have been
deviations from the traditional Republican foreign policy,
 
1
 
 and second, whether
there have been Islamist motivations behind the foreign-policy measures during
these periods. The degree to which Islamic elements pervade foreign policy
constitutes the essential research question of this study. As Islamic movements
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vary across and within the countries, what really constitutes an Islamist foreign
policy depends on context. This essay relies on the conceptualization of Zachary
Karabell. His analysis accepts the defining characteristics of Islamist elements
in foreign policy to be: an emphasis on the unity of the 
 
umma
 
 (community of
believers in Islam) surpassing the national borders; questioning the sovereignty
of secular states within the umma; struggle and distrust against Western influ-
ence on the Muslim world; and a common indisposition towards Zionism as the
local manifestation of Western hegemony.
 
2
 
 Therefore, these elements will be
explored among the programs and policies of the pro-Islamist parties that came
to power.
Although the history of political Islam in Turkey in terms of party politics can be
traced back as early as the beginning of the multiparty period, this study is limited to
the periods of the Refah Partisi (Welfare Party, RP), which held power between
1996 and 1997, and the AKP in its first period in power, between 2002 and 2007.
The RP’s period in 1996–1997 was chosen, as that party’s ascendance to power
constitutes a turning point in terms of increased Islamization in politics.
 
3
 
 Further-
more, it was the first pro-Islamist party to win a plurality of the votes. For its part,
the AKP won the November 2002 elections with a landslide victory, repeated its
success with an even larger percentage of the vote (almost 48 percent) in 2007, and
is serving its second term as a one-party government. This in itself is quite an
achievement in Turkish politics, which have been historically characterized by
minority and coalition governments with a few exceptions.
The essay begins with the main elements of the RP’s foreign-policy approach in
its party program, underlining major events and corresponding policies of the
Refahyol (abbreviation of the Refah-True Path Party, DYP, coalition) government
under the leadership of Necmettin Erbakan. This section ends with an evaluative
discussion of Islamist elements in the foreign policies during the Refahyol period.
The subsequent section focuses on the party program, foreign affairs develop-
ments, and the response of the AKP, paying specific attention to whether there are
Islamist elements in the foreign policy measures taken by the party. The third
section compares the RP and the AKP periods in terms of foreign policy formula-
tion in party programs and policies. The study concludes with an exploration of
continuities and discontinuities with the traditional foreign policy, the role of
Islamist elements in this process, and the dynamics behind limitations and changes
of these periods. As both parties share a pro-Islamic orientation and are rooted
in the National Outlook Movement, they are easily regarded as similar; neverthe-
less, this study’s contribution is the awareness that even subtle differences between
parties from similar ideological backgrounds might result in substantially different
foreign-policy formations. Moreover, the study argues that there is no unique
Islam in Turkey in political terms; rather, there are multiple Islams, as the
comparison of the policies of the AKP and the RP indicate. Finally, the domestic
pro-Islamist rhetoric of political parties might not necessarily transform into poli-
cies. Once in power, they are subject to rationalist cost-benefit calculations and
moderation.
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The Foreign Policy Program of the Welfare Party: Islam as a Foreign 
Policy Principle
 
The election manifesto of the RP prioritizes foreign policy as one of six primary
policy areas, summarizing the main aim of the party to be the creation an indepen-
dent foreign policy, distinctive in personality, which foresees a leading role for
Turkey. The manifesto depicted friendship, peace, and justice as the core values in
foreign policy. In this context, improved relations with all countries was declared to
be the main aim; however, in order to position Turkey as the leading country,
Turkey’s place was identified within the World Union of Muslim Countries. The
pro-Islamist overview of the party was revealed through the argument that the Euro-
pean Union is a “Christian Club” formed according to the recommendations of Pope
Pius XII.
 
4
 
 In terms of Turkey’s relations with the European Union, national policy
was designed to follow the five-decade-old principles of the National Outlook
Movement, according to which economic rather than political relations are
improved with the European countries within the context of an export-oriented
foreign policy. Despite the proposition to develop economic relations, the program
declared the Customs Union Agreement signed on March 6, 1995, as illegitimate.
Thus, the Islamist stance was subtly articulated throughout the discourse of foreign
policy. Solutions to problems in foreign policy were delineated as removing US
Operation Provide Comfort,
 
5
 
 sarcastically titled the Poised Hammer (
 
Çekiç Güç
 
)
in the Turkish media; preventing the intervention of other countries in Turkey’s
struggle against terror; and lifting the embargo on Iraq. The National Outlook
nationalism underlying the manifesto blended religiosity with anti-Westernization.
 
6
 
The manifesto was divided into two columns that sharply differentiated between
the National Outlook and the “imitators” (
 
taklitçiler
 
,) who copy the West in contra-
diction with national values and norms, in domestic and foreign policies. The mani-
festo also proposed the program of the Just Order (
 
Adil Düzen
 
). Moreover, an Islamic
Union was proposed as a future to a solution on the ground, not only for foreign-
policy problems but also for domestic problems, including terror. In the Just Order,
which could be said to represent the party program in outlining basic principles and
policies of the RP, the IMF, EU, and other international organizations were severely
criticized on the basis of belonging to a capitalist system based on interest. Instead,
an Islamic Common Market was proposed.
 
7
 
 By the same token, Islamist versions of
NATO, the United Nations, and UNICEF were suggested. In terms of the economic
dimension of foreign policies, moral values and Islamic principles were again central
in proposing a self-sufficient and independent economy that could rely on Turkish
migrant workers abroad and financial assistance from Muslim countries.
 
8
 
 In foreign-
policy formulation, Westernization was again specified as the main source of prob-
lems, with particular emphasis on anti-Semitism and pro-Islamism.
 
9
 
Major Events and Policies during the Refah Period
 
Although the RP emerged as the winner of the 1995 elections, it did not become a
member of the government until June 1996, when the party formed a coalition with
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the DYP. The Refahyol government served only for a year, with its leader,
Necmettin Erbakan, resigning in June 1997 during the February 28 process,
 
10
 
 a
move undertaken by the military.
One of the most important developments of the Refahyol period was the estab-
lishment of the D-8 (Developing 8), composed of Bangladesh, Egypt, Indonesia,
Iran, Malaysia, Nigeria, and Pakistan as an alternative to the G-7,
 
11
 
 in line with
the policies stated in the Election Manifesto on the Islamic Union. Furthermore,
Erbakan conducted two main foreign visits: the first one to Asia (Iran, Pakistan,
Malaysia, Singapore, and Indonesia) and the second one to Africa (Egypt, Libya,
and Nigeria). The tours were justified on the basis of a multidimensional approach
to foreign policy. The Iran visit stands out because of its economic content, during
the course of which Turkey signed a natural gas agreement with Iran. Furthermore,
the Libya visit was important for its political reflections on the domestic sphere, as
Libyan leader Muammar Qadhafi called for an independent Kurdish state and criti-
cized the treatment of the Kurdish minority in Turkey during the visit. Moreover,
Erbakan signed a communiqué accusing the United States of engaging in state
terrorism.
 
12
 
In this brief one-year period, the RP’s foreign policies could be characterized by
compromise, strategic retreat, and reversal. The coalition government’s program,
for example, stated that the government aimed to strengthen relations between
Turkey and the EU, in contrast to the general tone of the RP’s election manifesto.
However, at the same time, the government program made this support conditional,
emphasizing that costs and benefits would be taken into consideration on the basis
of sovereignty, integrity, and national interests, a point that was interpreted as the
RP’s compromise and moderation towards the EU.
 
13
 
In terms of its relations with the United States, the RP’s critical approach also
eased after coming to power, probably due to internal pressures and the moderating
effect of being in power.
 
14
 
 Although the election manifesto of 1995 proposed the
removal of Operation Provide Comfort, Erbakan had to change his position under
pressure from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Erbakan’s declaration of the United
States as a terrorist state caused some reaction during this period; however, he
ameliorated this harsh position later. The RP leadership renegotiated a natural gas
pipeline agreement with Iran at a time when the Clinton administration was signing
the Iran–Libya Act to prevent foreign investment. However, as Turkey’s agreement
with Iran did not involve any actual investment, it did not cause any considerable
crisis in relations with the United States.
Turkey’s policies towards Israel shared similar strategic reversals. Erbakan
claimed he would revoke the partnership agreement previously signed by the
Turkish military with Israel in August 1996; nevertheless, after coming to power he
signed the agreement and, furthermore, he approved the free trade agreement.
 
15
 
When in power, at first Erbakan ignored Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin
Netanyahu’s congratulations and request for a meeting. He also delayed the visit of
Israeli Minister of Foreign Affairs David Levy and criticized new settlements in the
occupied territories, yet ultimately, he did not reject Levy’s visit.
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As far as the Balkans, Central Asia, and the Caucasus were concerned, Erbakan
employed a religio-nationalist rhetoric; however, he did not make any visits to those
regions despite the intention he had expressed earlier to increase relations through
the Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO) in Central Asia and the Caucasus.
Given the party’s diplomatic visits and policies towards the Middle East and the
lack of any actual measure in other regions, it is possible to argue that the Islamic
perspective dominated the National Outlook Movement’s nationalism.
Finally, there were no major events concerning Turkish–Greek relations in this
period, despite Erbakan’s traditionally critical approach towards Greece, which
might partly be explained by the party’s short period in power and the persistence of
other priority areas.
 
Islamist Elements in the Foreign Policies of the RP
 
It is possible to identify pro-Islamist elements in the foreign-policy approach of the
RP both in terms of policy formulation and applied policies. However, the presence
of an underlying pro-Islamist worldview does not mean that the RP pursued purely
Islamist policies in the foreign sphere. On the contrary, many scholars and commen-
tators claim that the RP did moderate its original stance after coming to power and
reversed policy in many policy areas. Many scholars point to various examples of
moderation and compromises, such as Meliha Benli Altunı
 
[SCEDIL]
 
ık and Özlem Tür on
Israel policy,
 
16
 
 Elizabeth Özdalga on the EU and NATO,
 
17
 
 Sabri Sayarı on the
United States
 
18
 
 and the Customs Union,
 
19
 
 and Frank Tachau on the general policy
framework of the party.
 
20
 
 Moreover, as Sayarı notes, the RP was not a monolithic
entity.
 
21
 
 On some occasions, policy reversals were not only due to external pres-
sures from the secularist establishment (particularly the military) but also from
internal recommendations. Abdullah Gül’s objections to the Libya visit and the
successful attempt in excluding Sudan from the Africa tour might be considered in
this context.
On the other hand, as mentioned above, Islamic moral values proposed as a solu-
tion to the main problems in both the domestic and foreign context by the RP existed
both in the election manifesto and in the Just Order, which is practically the basic
text of the political tradition on which the RP is based. The emphases on religion
and orientation towards Islamic countries in the foreign policy of the Erbakan period
were accompanied by a negative stance towards the West and Westernization,
contemplating the influence of West within the framework of degeneration and
cultural contamination.
 
22
 
Benli Altunı
 
[SCEDIL] ık and Tür argue that the foreign-policy orientation towards the
Muslim Middle East was one of the basic elements of the RP’s “counter ideology.”
 
23
 
In contrast to previous governments, there was no official visit to the West during
the RP’s reign; Erbakan even refused to attend dinner at the EU summit meeting in
Dublin in December 1996. Furthermore, the first country to be visited was Iran.
Erbakan’s proposal to make Arabic a compulsory language for Turkish diplomats
might be considered as a further example of the degree of Eastern orientation in
s¸
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foreign policy during this period. Some authors also associate Erbakan’s poor inter-
est in Cyprus to the Turkish Cypriots’ secularized society structure.
 
24
 
In addition to ignoring the West and orienting to the East, Erbakan not only
visited Islamist regimes such as Iran but also held meetings with Islamist opposi-
tion groups in Middle Eastern countries. The RP, in many respects, seemed to
comply with the characteristics of Islamic foreign policy proposed by Karabell, in
that calls for economic and political integration with the wider Islamic world
through an Islamic Union and an Islamic Common Market are reminiscent of the
unity of the umma, accompanied by a salient distrust towards the West and particu-
larly towards Zionism. Nevertheless, all these policies were subject to immediate
reversals.
Overall, it could be argued that policy reversals were largely due to internal pres-
sures from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the military rather than due to a
change in ideological terms. The RP’s policy on the agreement with Israel provides
a good example, in that the signing of the agreement
 
25
 
 was delayed until the resigna-
tion of the Erbakan government in order to intimate the party’s reluctance. It could
also be argued that actual pro-Islamist tendencies either did not fully transform into
foreign policy formulation or remained under the surface due to severe domestic
opposition.
 
The Foreign Policy Program of the Justice and Development Party
 
The structure of the foreign-policy chapter in the AKP party program and election
manifesto represents an understanding of globalization and post-Cold War interna-
tional conjuncture. In the party program, foreign policy was formulated to be based
on multiple axes and reciprocal interests so as to establish flexible relations with
power centers.
 
26
 
 With this goal in mind, increased participation of parliament and
society in foreign policymaking was emphasized. The importance of relations with
the EU was underlined, and improving relations with the United States, Russia,
Central Asia, and the Caucasus was mentioned to be among the foreign-policy
targets. A noticeable approach in the party program in terms of foreign policy is the
repeated emphasis on the leadership role for Turkey in conflict and crisis resolu-
tion, as well as regional initiatives. Specifically speaking, solving problems in
Turkey’s relations with Greece, particularly on Cyprus; taking an active role in
peace-building in the Middle East; and increasing efforts to improve Turkey’s posi-
tion in the European Security and Defense Concept (ESDC) and the Economic
Cooperation Organization (ECO) in the Black Sea region, Central Asia, and the
Caucasus were identified as key foreign-policy aims. Protection of Turkish citizens
abroad and increased relations with all countries were also mentioned. On the
relations with international financial institutions such as the IMF and World
Bank, the program stated that relations should be maintained in accordance with
national interests. Realist and national interest-based foreign policy formulation
was mentioned as the main understanding underlying the AKP’s foreign-policy
approach.
 
27
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Major Events and Policies during the AKP Period: Caution and Pragmatism
 
The first period of the AKP started in 2002, and the party formed a second single-
party government after the 2007 elections. The 2003 Iraq War, developments in
Turkey–EU relations, and the Cyprus issue were among the initial political develop-
ments in the AKP’s first period. To begin with, integration with the EU was a clear
foreign-policy consideration during the AKP period. The AKP’s pro-EU stance
in fact preceded its coming to power, and the constitutional amendments that were
critical for accession negotiations during the Ecevit period were made with the
AKP’s support.
 
28
 
 During the initial years, reform packages on the rule of law,
human rights, and the market economy were approved by parliament so as to satisfy
the Copenhagen Criteria. Between 2002 and 2004, 17 legal reform packages were
passed.
 
29
 
In line with the EU approach, the AKP formulated a new approach to the Cyprus
issue by supporting the Annan Plan, which proposed a united Cyprus and pressured
President Rauf Denkta
 
[SCEDIL]  for a referendum; Turkish Cypriots showed their support for
the plan in the referendum by a 65 percent majority vote.
 
30
 
 Although the Annan Plan
was not recognized due to Greek Cypriot opposition, the change in policy towards
Cyprus led to US efforts in removing the isolation of the Turkish part of the island.
The AKP also proposed to open a port and an airport to the Greek Cypriots as part of
the Customs Union Agreement and as an attempt to keep up the pace of Turkish-EU
relations. Nevertheless, initial enthusiasm on behalf of the AKP towards the EU
diminished due to the EU’s reluctance to treat Turkey on equal terms with other
candidate countries and the poor response to the AKP’s port proposal. The unsup-
portive decision of the European Court of Human Rights on the headscarf ban in
public places in Turkey and the lack of Islamic liberties in the progression reports
might also have caused disappointment on behalf of the AKP. Critical developments
in Iraq on the verge of civil war, especially after Saddam Hussein’s execution, also
forced the government to change priorities. Moreover, internal developments, espe-
cially regarding the discussion of presidential elections, might have caused domestic
concerns to have primacy over foreign-policy concerns.
Regarding relations with the United States, the Iraq War and the Parliamentary
Bill Crisis
 
31
 
 (
 
Tezkere Krizi
 
) constituted the main problems. One-third of the
rejection votes came out of the AKP, and this affected the course of Turkish–
American relations, which went as far as raiding a building belonging to the Turkish
military in Suleymaniyya, in northern Iraq. Violence in Fallujah was condemned as
“genocide,” the leader of Hamas’s military wing, Khalad Mashaal, was invited to
Turkey, and anti-Americanism increased dramatically during the AKP period.
 
32
 
Erdo
 
[GBREV]
 
an criticized US policies towards the PKK issue severely during this first
period of the AKP between 2002 and 2007.
 
33
 
 Erdo
 
[GBREV] an’s visit to Sudan and partici-
pation in the Arab League Summit caused further uneasiness in the United States.
Turkey’s increased dependence on Russia for natural gas and alleged cross-border
operations of the Turkish army in Iraq created further concerns for the United
States.
 
34
 
 Nevertheless, since the 2003 Iraq War, relations with the United States
s¸
g˘
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have improved considerably, and the United States has become more sensitive to
Turkey’s concerns about the PKK.
Among other foreign-policy issues, Turkish–Greek relations did not show any
major deterioration despite minor military conflicts in the Aegean Sea. It was, in
general, a rapprochement period between the two countries, despite occasional diffi-
culties and incidents. Finally, Turkey pursued an activist and mediating role in the
Middle East. The number of visits to the region increased dramatically.
 
Islamist Elements in the Foreign Policies of the AKP
 
In the party program and election manifesto, foreign-policy understanding was
shaped by a Western-oriented and multidimensional approach, with an emphasis on
the requirements of the post-Cold War period and globalization. Political abuse of
religion was condemned in the party program, and pressures on beliefs and religious
freedom were criticized within the general framework of human rights and democ-
racy. However, Islamic identity was still important for the AKP, at least culturally,
and the party program concluded with a religious phrase.
 
35
 
 The AKP insisted that it
was not an Islamist party but rather a conservative democratic political entity.
It is difficult to assess pro-Islamist elements in the applied foreign policy
measures of the AKP. First of all, the AKP, like the RP, is not monolithic. In addi-
tion to different segments of Islamist and conservative groups, the AKP has more
center-right members. Even after the election in 2002, some politicians previously
affiliated with the Motherland Party (Anavatan Partisi, ANAP
 
)
 
, the DYP, and the
Nationalist Action Party (Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi, MHP) have become members
of the AKP. Secondly, there were differences in approach during the initial period
and later statements in foreign-policy areas. Initial interpretations of the foreign
policies of the AKP were in support of the AKP’s liberal and Western-oriented
measures, acknowledging the break from the National Outlook line.
 
36
 
 Later years
were more characterized by more fluctuations; however, foreign relations were
usually kept at a working level.
Regarding the EU, the extent of Islamist motives is debatable. A pro-EU
approach both in terms of program and policies, particularly reforms and efforts
towards accession, was quite different from the traditional stances of pro-Islamist
parties. Nevertheless, whether this is a strategic move in order to diminish the role
of the military in politics, to prevent party closures and increase religious freedoms
in the domestic sphere, or to represent a genuine pro-EU approach is difficult to
answer. Furthermore, for the period beginning on February 28, 1997, it might be
claimed that the EU has become an anchor for those desiring change.
 
37
 
 Finally, the
initial enthusiasm towards the EU lost pace in the later period. It is also difficult to
evaluate this policy change, although it is not a reversal. It might be a strategy with
national motives on the basis of reluctance of the EU towards Turkey as well as an
acquiescence that the EU might not support further expansion of religious freedoms.
Participation in the Arab League Summit, the visit to Sudan, the previous crisis
spurred by the invitation of the leader of the military wing of Hamas, and a blurred
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attitude towards the EU, the United States, and Israel are debated issues in terms of
Islamist motives in these policies. Nevertheless, one should note that the party has
never taken a consistently negative attitude towards Western countries, and when
the party leadership criticized these countries, there were no religious connotations
in the criticism.
 
Comparison of the RP and the AKP in Terms of Foreign Policy
 
Party Programs
 
38
 
 in Comparison
 
Comparison of the party programs of the RP and the AKP requires acknowledge-
ment that the programs were and should have been different, as the AKP was estab-
lished by a reformist group within the RP who tried to distance themselves from the
National Outlook background.
 
39
 
 However, there are commonalities in the programs.
First of all, both programs aimed to give a leading role to Turkey in the international
arena. While the leadership role was more general in the RP’s election manifesto,
Turkey’s responsibility was more specifically stated in the AKP program in terms of
crisis and conflict resolution and mediation, as well as activism in regional initia-
tives. Emphasis on Islamic identity is also a shared point. Nevertheless, the RP
placed Islam as a policy tool in terms of forming an Islamic front against the West
and establishing Islamist Unions in the areas of international economy and politics.
The AKP, on the other hand, constrained religious identity to the individual and
cultural levels.
On the EU, the RP claimed that the EU is a “Christian club” and proposed a
Muslim alternative. The AKP, on the other hand, was quite positive, going so far as
to grant full cooperation for undertaking immediate legal reform required by the
Copenhagen criteria. Although the RP party program argued that good relations
with the West were part of the foreign-policy agenda, the RP proposed a National
Outlook approach, which required termination of Operation Provide Comfort and
the Customs Union Agreement. The AKP emphasized the requirements of the new
international conjuncture after the end of Cold War, and although it was stated that
the policies would be in line with national interests, there was no reservation for any
Western or non-Muslim country. Yet the AKP program devoted special importance
to Muslim countries both in terms of bilateral relations and the Organization of the
Islamic Conference (
 
[IDOT  ] slam Konferansı Örgütü).
 
Major Events and Responses: Similarities and Differences
 
The AKP may have been formed by a group within the RP, but as mentioned above,
the party, both in statements and programs, has emphasized differences deliberately.
This insight might be considered to be the outcome of a learning process since
February 28, an intention to avoid conflict with secularists (particularly the mili-
tary), the loss of popular support for the National Outlook/Just Order line, and a
more realist and pragmatic approach of the young reformists in the party. The
˙
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approach to the EU by the two parties is a good example in this respect. Another
reason might be the lack of concrete support from the Muslim countries for
Erbakan’s policies, which forced the AKP to turn towards the West. However,
differences are not limited to the EU, and there are many other foreign-policy areas
in which Erbakan’s leadership and Erdo
 
[GBREV] an’s leadership are different. The Cyprus
policy, their positions on international financial institutions such as the IMF and
the World Bank, and relations with Greece can be considered within this context.
While the RP’s attitude on these issues might be defined, at best, as reluctant, the
AKP acted flexibly and enthusiastically, especially during the initial period of its
rule. On Israel, the RP’s attitude was very clear, going as far as to aim to cancel
the agreement.
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 The AKP’s attitude is more mixed. On the one hand, National
Outlook supporters in particular accused the party of supporting Israel’s policies,
 
41
 
and the Ministry of Energy agreed on a multi-purpose pipeline that is expected
to improve relations.
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 On the other hand, the invitation of Hamas’s Mashaal,
Erdo
 
[GBREV]
 
an’s accusing Israel of state terrorism, and allegations that Israeli soldiers
are training Kurdish militias in northern Iraq
 
43
 
 increased tensions between two
countries.
Comparison of US policy during the RP and AKP periods has a similar course.
The RP’s attitude is in line with its general reaction against the Western world.
However, the RP did tone down in time, and US–Turkey relations did not go through
a major crisis.
 
44
 
 There had been critical statements made by the AKP against the
United States, initially particularly on military bases.
 
45
 
 However, this attitude later
changed as well. Increased interest in the Arab-Islamic world and the AKP’s accus-
ing the United States of not being decisive in the fight against terrorism created
occasional problems.
 
46
 
 However, policies towards the United States are not hostile
but rather specific to developments and likely to be tactical, as the rapprochement
with reciprocal diplomatic and military visits since early 2007 illustrates.
Both parties, relying on the party programs, gave special importance to relations
with Muslim countries, as mentioned above. Erbakan’s attitude is again clearer,
as compared with that of Erdo
 
[GBREV]
 
an, as the former did not undertake any visits to
West, and the bulk of official visits were made to Asia and Africa. Erdo
 
[GBREV]
 
an initially
was more Western-oriented; the selection of Greece for the first official visit was
quite radical and positive in terms of foreign policy. However, visits to Muslim
countries, including to Iran, increased,
 
47
 
 and the first official visit of 2007 was to
Lebanon.
 
48
 
A common aspect in the foreign policy of these two periods was the dominant
role of the party leaders in decisionmaking and limiting critical decisions to a small
group of advisors such as [IDOT  ] lnur Çevik for Erbakan49 and Ahmet Davuto[GBREV] lu, Cüneyt
Zapsu, Ömer Çelik, Mücahit Aslan, and Egemen Ba[GBREV] ı[SCEDIL]  for Erdo[GBREV] an.50 Erbakan’s
visit to Libya, despite Abdullah Gül’s warnings51 and the exclusion of diplomats
from the Syrian and Iranian visits,52 might be interpreted as policies that were not
formulated by the party but rather by Erbakan and a small group. It has also been
claimed that Erdo[GBREV] an excluded Gül in foreign policymaking when Gül served as the
minister of foreign affairs.53
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Conclusion
This essay tries to assess the influence of pro-Islamist governments on Turkish
foreign policy. In this context, whether these governments deviated from the tradi-
tional foreign-policy framework specifically on the basis of Islamist motivations is
critical.
Both parties expressed their intention to position Turkey as a leader country in
their programs. The AKP’s program specifically mentioned taking initiative, even
in conflict resolution.54 The Asia and Africa tours illustrate the RP’s addresses to
an Islamic Union for achieving a leadership role. On the other hand, Erdo[GBREV] an’s
statements were in line with the party program, and the AKP leader’s statements
were enthusiastic regarding a mediatory role in crisis, the latest example being
Lebanon.55 These policies might be considered as posing a challenge to the tradi-
tional non-intervention principle in Turkish foreign policy; however, such policies
are not specific to the RP and the AKP. Rather, they are part of the general frame-
work of activism that began during the Özal period.56 It is possible to argue, at least
for the case of the AKP, that the government’s activism is cautious and tries to stay
out of conflict.57 The traditional pro-Western element of foreign policy might have
been challenged during the RP period, as there was not even a visit to the West;
however, no major crises took place between Turkey and Western countries in this
period. The AKP’s enthusiasm about the EU, whatever the underlying motivations
might have been, indicates that it was not anti-Western, neither in policies nor in
program. The RP had at least attempted to change traditional foreign policy;58 the
AKP, on the other hand, stated explicitly that it would not challenge foreign policy
right after coming to power.59 The AKP, unlike the RP, did not emphasize Islam and
insisted that it was a political, not a religious, party.60 The party program goes as far
as condemning those abusing religion for political purposes.61 Menderes Çınar
argues that while the RP tried to take the control of the state by pious cadres, the
AKP tried to put forward that religious people can also be successful in politics.62
Erhan Do[GBREV] an goes so far as to argue that the AKP is a “byproduct and agent” of the
secular modernization project.63
Despite modification of Turkish foreign policy in general in the post-Cold War
period, it is still possible to speak about challenges and changes during the two
governments. The RP’s orientation towards the Arab-Islamic world and its Asia and
Africa tours might be considered to be deviations from the traditional foreign
policy. However, the anti-Western approach in foreign policy was challenged by the
secular establishment, policies were reversed even when the RP was still in power,
and anti-Westernism faded after the RP period.
As far as the AKP is concerned, the major change was in Turkey’s Cyprus
policy and support of the Annan Plan. However, this policy change did not involve
any pro-Islamist motivations. Despite the latest slowing-down, EU–Turkey rela-
tions improved and acquired pace during the AKP rule, and its pro-Western, and
specifically pro-European, emphasis in foreign policy is common to the rest of
Republican history. Deterioration of relations with the United States might be
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considered to be a deviation from traditional foreign policy; however, the
occasional problems in relations with the United States do not embody any pro-
Islamist rhetoric either. The improvement of relations in the beginning of the
AKP’s second term vindicates the lack of ideological position towards the United
States.
The foreign policies of the AKP and the RP were made within certain constraints;
therefore, assessing whether these two parties would be more willing to change
traditional foreign policy in the absence of limitations would be at best speculation.
One of the most important limitations is the compositions of members and the
electorate. Neither the AKP nor the RP is monolithic. This point is important in
terms of both understanding the mixed approaches within these parties in foreign-
policy matters and in putting pressure on these parties to apply intended programs
and policy formulations.
Furthermore, both parties faced—and the AKP still faces—skepticism from the
secular Kemalist establishment; therefore, both the RP and the AKP have tried to
avoid conflict in foreign policy and security issues, which are traditionally under the
control of the secular line. When Erbakan tried to challenge, he was forced to
retreat. The AKP, on the other hand, formulated its policies in greater tension due to
the contradictory pressures from its Islamist base and the multiple nature of the elec-
torate with different demands, in addition to skepticism on behalf of the military and
other segments of the Kemalist establishment.64 The February 28 process is critical
from this perspective, as it enabled the military to make modifications in the socio-
political system. After February 28, not only the AKP but also the traditionalist line
from the RP softened Islamist rhetoric. The secular establishment is very strong in
Turkey, and the intention to keep religious influences on politics and society under
control is very powerful.
In considering the role of Islamist elements in the arguable changes in foreign
policy during the RP and AKP periods, there are contradictory comments. Gareth
Winrow argues that the religious lobby was influential on Turkish foreign policy
during the RP period.65 Mustafa Aydın, on the other hand, claims that Islam’s role
in Turkish foreign policy is limited to justification and covers other motivations
and that Islamist motivations constitute a minor part of orientation towards the
Middle East.66 Ideologically, there might be Islamist considerations, but once in
power, political interests apparently supersede religious values, even in the case of
Erbakan.
The RP’s foreign-policy measures and its attempt to challenge traditional foreign
policy included pro-Islamist motivations; however, strong reaction from the secular
establishment and the February 28 process prevented any possible change in
Turkish foreign policy. As far as the AKP is concerned, that party is very cautious
and pragmatist in foreign policy matters, and the party has differentiated between
its approaches in the domestic and foreign realms. In this respect, the party
leadership has consistently refrained from religious rhetoric in its criticism towards
other countries, even during the heated debates regarding religion within the
country.
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